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Introduction

This essay will reflect on the meaning of life as a gift from God and the
connection this giftedness has to the question of assisted suicide and euthanasia.
In particular, it will be a response to the arguments on legitimizing euthanasia put
forth by Dick Westley in his book When it's Right to Die: Conflicting Voices,
Difficult Choices.
Our American society is in the midst of a great cultural debate over the
morality of persons asking for assistance in the act of killing themselves. Many
people are also wondering if traditional taboos against killing others out of the
motive of mercy ought to be removed as well. In the case of assisted suicide, the
law courts seem split. In the minds of some judges they have found a firm basis for
allowing physician assisted suicide under the fourteenth amendment
(Washington State), to others, such as New York state judge Thomas Griesa
there is no such basis. 1
The Catholic church has weighed in heavily against assisted suicide and
euthanasia because the teaching of the church does not see that human life is
strictly autonomous from God, but rather places it in the context of the
theonomous. By this, the church means that the human person participates in the
life and wisdom of God through his or her own will and reason2• Life is intimately
connected to and sustained by the Divine. If one holds this belief, it follows that
there are ethical ramifications regarding the disposition of human life. In the view
of those who hold a theonomous stance toward human life, persons are not at
liberty to simply take their own lives or the lives of other persons, no matter the
level of suffering.
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This position can seem impervious to compassion. However, faith expresses
compassion by abiding with the sick and dying, not by facilitating their demise. In
his book, Westley argues that the Catholic church has misconstrued its basic
principle that human life is a gift from God. He argues that God cannot give us
our lives and then restrain us from autonomous intelligent choices regarding their
disposition. He holds that the church is contradictory when it teaches that life is a
gift from God and yet places constraints on what one can do with that gift.
Westley wonders if our lives are really gifts, free and clear, or if they are simply on
loan from God.
I. Westley's Question: Is Life a Gift or a Loan?

Westley argues that the church's position on euthanasia and assisted suicide
needs to be changed in order to allow for the legitimate taking of life in certain
circumstances of grave illness. He does not want to abrogate the teaching against
euthanasia and assisted suicide but simply argue for its "emendation".3
Practically speaking, however, the emendation he has in mind would reverse the
teaching of the church which rejects the licitity of taking one's own life due to
suffereing and sickness. As a basis for his emendation Westley critiques a
statement made by the u.s. Catholic Bishops' Pro-life committee in Nutrition
and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections (1992). The statement reads:
"Our Church views life as a sacred trust, a gift over which we are given
stewardship and not absolute dominion."4
Westley believes that the Bishops logically contradict themselves by
juxtaposing gift with stewardship. According to Westley, a gift is something
received by the benefactor without further regard for the donor's intent or
purpose.
Either life is given to us by God as a gift, in which case it is ours and ours unconditionally,
or we are given life the way the servants were given money in Luke 19:11-27: It was
never truly given but merely temporarily entrusted to them. In that case, our life is really
God's and we only have it on something akin to inter-library loan.5

While Westley's logic may seem compelling, the fact is that God not only gives
our lives to us but also continues to be intimately involved in guiding those lives
to a purpose which God has deemed worthy of our dignity.6 Is this continued
involvement in directing the purpose of human life an intolerable intrusion into
how an individual utilizes that gift? We do not see it as such.
Westley does not argue that persons have "unconditional" dominion over the
lives of others. No, we are to exercise "responsible stewardship" toward their
lives. 7 However, he does argue that for oneselfthe gift oflife is unconditional due
to God's confidence and faith in humankind. Westley holds human freedom and
reason in high esteem and wants the glory of the human person to be seen in acts
of real freedom and sound delineration.
We would be very small indeed were we simply stewards charged with nothing more than
ten~g our lives in obedience to and on behalf of the One who really owned them .. .
Our lives are our own and, hence, at our disposaJ.8
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We want to respond to Westley's vision of human autonomy by explicitly
approaching two questions which seem to be implicit in his argument. First, can
one be free and be obedient? And secondly, in receiving a gift does one receive
from the donor the right to unconditional dominion over its use and purpose?
D. Freedom and Obedience

Westley is right in holding that the dignity of humankind inheres in our freedom
and reason. And he is also correct in defending an understanding offreedom and
reason which protects them from being reduced to some form of slavish
obedience. However, it has long been a position within the Church that human
freedom and reason only truly flourish and reflect human dignity when the
person who exercises these faculties does so out of a dependency upon God. To
argue as Westley does that our "lives are at our disposal" appears to advocate an
extreme autonomy over the self, which doesn't just "emend" the Catholic
tradition of Christian anthropology and metaphysics but would revolutionize it.
The Catholic moral tradition, as officially expressed through the ordinary
magisterium, has rejected euthanasia and assisted suicide as acts contrary to the
grateful response due to God which is at the heart of moral living.
The Church holds a paradoxical sense of freedom and reason in a context of
dependency and obedience. As the Second Vatican Council teaches:
For God willed that man should 'be left in the hand of his own counsel' so that he might
of his own accord seek his creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by
cleaving to him. Man's dignity therefore requires him to act out of conscious and free
choice, as moved and drawn in a personal way from within, and not by blind impulses in
himself or by mere external constraint .. . Since human freedom has been weakened by
sin it is only by the help of God's grace that man can give his actions their full and proper
relationship to God.9

In this passage the full paradox of human freedom and obedience is laid out. It
seems that Westley emphasizes only the diginity of the person's ability "to be left
in the hand of his own counsel." However, this personal freedom in searching for
the truth only attains its goal by obedience to and dependency upon the divine.
Persons become fully human not by claiming autonomy from the Giver of life,
but by "cleaving to him." We also attain knowledge of how to live, which
includes decisions about when to dispose oflife, by being "moved and drawn in a
personal way from within and not by blind impulse or ... external constraint."
Within this reference to one being personally "from within" is an allusion to
conscience which was described by the Council as the voice of God. 10
The way to liberty is not to be found in asserting one's independence from God
but in listening raptly (obeying) to God's voice in conscience. It is not blind
obedience {"blind impulses,"),l1 nor authoritarianism ("external constraint")
which leads to the truth about moral behavior but an openness to God in
obedience. In an attempt to protect the good of human freedom and intelligence
Westley pushes too far in the direction of autonomy. Westley, in Hans Urs von
Balthasar's words, has succumbed to the temptation to flee from the absolute
norm.
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The first temptation fears its own freedom . .. I would rather renounce it and leave it all
to (God). And this is the content of my prayer: that (God], not I, take charge of my
decisions .. . The second temptation fears interference. It fears the origin will meddle
with his own free gift. If I am supposed to exercise responsibility for myself ... I cannot
be expected to be forever looking over my shoulder at some alien rule . .. This is the ethic
of flight from the absolute norm, an ethic which holds that the very freedom we owe to
our origin cannot coexist with Him (God).12

A more balanced mode of protecting freedom and intellect can be found in the
formation of conscience according to the truth. In Christianity the truth is a
person, Jesus Christ, and so to radically isolate the ill person from relatedness to
God by considering human life to be completely under one's own dominion l3 is
to negate the very source of liberty: knowing the truth in Jesus. It is only in the
paradoxical tension between gift and dependency that the dignity of human
persons can be worked out. In relaxing this tension, as Westley does, in order to
favor the promotion of autonomous thinkng regarding the disposal of one's own
life, an aberrational understanding of human freedom, understood as separate
from divine influence, is fostered.
But to understand why this is so, we need to recall three points of
contemporary Christian teaching. The first is that human being is an instance of
created being which is by that fact contingent being. The second teaching is that
human being is personal being which is by that fact intrinsically relational being.
The third teaching is that it is precisely this intrinsically relational quality by
which the human being is created in the image and likeness of the Triune God.
The upshot of these three points is that the Persons of the Trinity themselves are
not autonomous in the way that Westley claims for human beings. We consider
very briefly each point in tum.
(1) For the Catholic faith, the radical distinction between God and creatures
implies that contingency is inseparable from creaturely status. In Thomistic
tradition only God is His own being. Everything else that is real receives its being.
Contingency, and moreover, a contingency that is continuous, belongs to the
essence of creaturehood. This is not a covert way of arguing that God alone is real
and that creatures have no reality over against Him. It is only to say that the
creature's very real, though limited, being is continously dependent upon God's
own willing to be of this limited being. When Westley claims that "our lives are at
our disposal," he appears to be speaking at one and the same time in the
indicative and imperative mood. He appears to be claiming a factual autonomy
of the self over the self which is simply and radically at odds with the facts as
understood by the Catholic faith. (And if in Catholic morality "the imperative is
rooted in the indicative," there can be no "imperative" of radical human
autonomy in the question of the direct termination of our own lives when the
necessary conditions of specifically creaturely existence reduce such claims to
posture and imposture.)
(2) Turning to the question of human being as relational being, we would first
acknowledge W. Norris Clarke's point that all being is in some sense intrinsically
relational. In an article entitled "Person, Being, and St. Thomas," he states that
both substantiality and relationality are primordial modes of being. He writes:
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It turns out, then, that relationality and substantiality go together as two distinct but

inseparable modes of reality. Substance is the primary mode, in that all else, including
relations, depend on it as their ground. But since "every substance exists for the sake of its
operations," as St. Thomas has just told us, being as substance, as existing in itself,
naturally flows over into being as relational, turned towards others by its selfcommunicating action. To be is to be substance-in-relation. 14

Approaching more directly the question of personal being, it should be noted
that the classical emphasis has been placed in explicating the classical definition
"individual supposit of a rational nature." The emphasis has been placed on what
is incommunicable and substantial. Yet the Christian tradition has also
considered relationality as constitutive of personhood. If it is true that all being is
relational, it can be argued that being as personal is essentially marked by a
special i.e., universal relatedness. The grounds of this universal relatedness are
found in the rational creature's capacity for abstraction. We remember that the
person as rational is in at least potential relationship with anything that is
intelligible and is likewise in at least potential relationship with anything that
appears to him or her as intelligibly good. This is the meaning behind Aristotle's
cryptic remark about the human soul being "in some measure everything."
Josef Pieper, cited in Clarke's essay, explicitly draws together the
incommunicable and the relational aspects of personal being. He writes:
The higher the form of intrinsic existence, the more developed becomes the relatedness
with reality, also the more profound and comprehensive becomes the sphere of this
relationship: namely, the world. And the deeper such relations penetrate the world of
reality, the more intrinsic becomes the subject's existence . .. These two aspects
combined-dwelling most intensively within itself, and being capax universi, able to grasp
the universe-together constitute the essence of the spirit. Any definition of spirit will have
to contain these two aspects as its core.IS

(3) We turn to the question of the human as God's image and likeness. Westley
could have pointed to Aquinas's prologue to question la2ae in which the point is
made that human beings are made in God's image and likeness because they are
masters of their own acts. One could develop this remark of Aquinas's by arguing
that just as God is sovereign so humans, made in His image and likeness, are
called to a like sovereignity. Including, one supposes, a like sovereignity over
matters of life and death.
Yet Aquinas's notion of the human being made to the image and likeness of
God is more complex than this. Behind the sheer power to determine one's action
lies the source of such power; namely, the activities of knowledge and love.
In speaking about the divine image in the human, Aquinas distinguished
between the image of representation and the image of conformity. In the image of
representation, the soul knows and loves itself in a manner analogous to the
fashion in which God knows and loves himself. In the image of conformity, the
soul knows and loves God in a manner analogous to the fashion in which God
knows and loves God. The first image is in every human creature by its capacity
for the immanent action of knowledge and love. The second is present only by
grace and is perfected in the light of glory. It is realized not in detachment from
God but is rather only present when human knowing and loving find their
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ultimate point, object, and fulfillment in Him. In other words, the perfection of
the Divine image in the human is realized not in sovereign freedom but in loving
attachment.
One sees this pattern manifested even in the life of the Godhead. Catholic faith
teaches that although God is one in nature, He is three in person. The trinity of
Persons must be understood in such a fashion as not to compromise the unity of
the Divine nature. This has been traditionally handled by the teaching that the
persons in the Trinity are persons by virtue of their relations of origin. That is to
say that the Father is the Father only by reason of His relationship with the Son
(generation). The Son is only the Son by reason of His relationship with the
Father (filiation). The Spirit is the Spirit only by reason of His relation with the
Father and Son (active and Passive spiration). The persons of the Trinity are
subsistent relationships. We think of human persons as being persons who then
have relationships. But Divine persons just are their relationships. And so, even in
the Trinity, there is not the sort of sovereignity that Westley imagines for human
persons. Persons are persons by virtue of their relationships as well as by virtue of
their independence.

m. Giving and the Donor's Intention
Recalling that Westley favors a notion of gift which emphasizes its
independent status from the donor's purposes he argues that our lives, as gifts
from God, are under our complete dominion (78). In order to argue against this
understanding of gift, Paul Camenisch's essay, which appeared several years ago,
is helpful. 16 In that essay Camenisch does not deal directly with the issue of life
being a gift from God, but his study provides a basis from which to draw
inferences about this topic. He does make one brief remark regarding life as a gift:
Finally we turn to life itself as a gift. Here again those who assert that it is a gift intend to
say largely positive things about it .. . that we should be grateful to the giver of it; that it is
still in some sense the giver's and so should not be abused or destroyed by us.

Camenisch also points out the limitation of using gift language about human
life.
Here the recipient exists only by virtue of the gift, the recipient virtually is the gift. But can
the gift and the recipient be one in the same? . .. If life is a gift, it is so in a limited or a
unique sense .. . [The difficulties in using gift language to refer to human life] ought not
compel us to abandon the otherwise useful language of gift,17

To be sure any language about life being a gift is metaphorical in nature and is not
a strict application. However, analogical or metaphorical language is used to
m~r~ fully ex~ress a reality which cannot be simply captured discursively. Some
legttlmate clalms can be made based on analogical thinking.
Generally speaking when a gift is given and accepted the recipient's use of the
gift is not radically severed from the donor's intention. It is commonly accepted
that if one gives a gift to another, he or she has at least a general sense of what the
donor proposes the recipient to do with it. Abiding by this intention is part of the
fullness of gift exchange. At the least, it can be presumed, the donor does not will
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the destruction of the very gift he or she presented in an effort to symbolize the
self-offering of the donor to the recipient. The gift's destruction would hardly be
showing grateful conduct toward the donor. 18
Westley argues that gift and stewardship are incompatible models for
understanding human life. Either one receives a gift which is defined as
something given with no strings attached or one receives a loan that one is
expected to use according to the specifications of the donor.
A bit of reflection on the nature of a gift will help us to see what is wrong with
this account of things. A gift is characterized as (1) gratuitous, (2) reflective of the
heart and mind of the giver, (3) intended to effect and benefit the receiver and
which calls for a response which will vary according to the nature of the gift
received.
Westley seems to locate the essential meaning of gift in the "right" to use the
gift as one sees fit. The note of possession is essential. A gift is a transaction in
which something which was "mine" now becomes "yours."
This does not adequately distinguish a gift from something given in fair
compensation. Mere transfer of ownership can be a matter of ajust wage, a right,
and not a gift at all. Surely, close to the heart of the notion of a gift lies the idea that
a gift is, first of all, something given freely. It is a question of something given to
me which is precisely not my due.
If we remember that God was under no necessity in creating (for there was no
one to "owe" anything to), and if we likewise remember that creation is not an
event of the past but an ongoing reality (since everything that is not God would
fade into non-being the moment God ceased to will it to be), then we can say that
our existence is not owed to us at all by God. We exist only as His ongoing gift.
Secondly, a gift which remains a gift is always something which signals the
disposition and character of the giver. If the disposition of the giver becomes lost
to view then what was a gift becomes merely a possession. This is why things we
have received as gifts remain important to us, not because we have exclusive
rights to their use, or because of their monetary value, but because they signify the
love of the one who gave. A gift ceases being a gift to us the degree to which the
dispositions and heart of the giver become unimportant.
Human life is a gift which is meant to teach us about the dispositions of the
giver of life. He is essentially a giver. He did not and does not retain life within
Himself. He would have the "right" to be the only reality but He wished matters
otherwise. He is generous and calls us to a like generosity. To understand the gift
quality of human life as an entitlement to unlimited dominion over the gift is to
misunderstand the spirit in which it was given. It is to misunderstand the motives
of the giver. It is to lose appreciation for life as a gift.
Thirdly, a gift is meant to affect the receiver in a certain way which calls for a
proportionate response. As the gift affects the receiver more inwardly, the
response called for becomes at the same time more focused and more free.
Let us say one gives his or her niece a flute for her birthday. It is a gift that calls
for some acknowledgment of her uncle's thoughtfulness. It does not necessarily
call for her to become a flutist. She may in fact have no talent for or interest in the
flute. The gift is extrinsic to my niece and her own real dreams. She may use it as a
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wall decoration if she pleases with no impropriety.
But let us imagine that one had the capacity to give not flutes but the passion
and talent for playing the flute. This would be a gift that would profoundly affect
the whole personality of the recipient. There would be something in the nature of
the gift received that would cry out for a musical response; let us say a sensitive
and unique rendition Mozart's flute concerto number one. The recipient's
distinctive gift (no previously existing rendition of Mozart's concerto number one
ever caught his joy quite this way) could only find release in the act of playing.
It will be apparent that the gift of musical talent is something that is more
inward, closer to being an essential part ofthe personality (we do not say person)
than is the gift of a flute. This gift calls for a determined (musical) response and yet
the response called for is free and a matter of inspiration.
Let us go further inward. Let us consider the gift that God has made to us -not
of our talents, but of our very being. What sort of response is called for?
The response that traditional spirituality gives to this question is adoration. We
adore God precisely as we acknowledge Him to be the source of our very being.
On the one hand, this response is demanded, not by the imperious will of a
jealous God, but by the very nature of the gift itself. The gift of life demands of its
own nature a proportionate response which is worship. On the other hand, this
response will be the freest act possible for a human being because in this act we
acknowledge, realize, and give thanks for all that we truly are.
It will be evident to the Catholic reader that the only proportionate response to
this gift of God is eucharist. It is an act of thanksgiving to God for his deeds of
creation and redemption, effected in Jesus the Christ. It is also an act of sacrifice
in which we, together with Jesus, offer our whole lives to the Father as the only
possible response to His gift.
The gift quality of the life that we receive from God does not call for an attitude
of dominion. It calls for the eucharist where we offer our lives to God, not in
secure possession, but in thanksgiving.
Overwhelmed as we are, and understandably so, by our own impending
illnesses and death, it is not without sympathy that one looks to Westley's
argument and his compassionate motives. However, this compassion is at the cost
of a faith component which is essential to human dignity; we derive our identity
from the divine intimacy which creates and sustains us in love and which nothing
can destroy (Rom. 8). Arguing that one can take his or her own life in the context
?f g~eat sufferin~ and sickness raises the question of acting out of pride or,
lromcally, despaIr rather than freedom, reason, and faith. Holding out suicide as
th~ ultimate solution for the gravely ill appears as an acquiescence to despair, or
pnde, no~ an act of dignity and faith. "In this unbearable suffering," the informed
person mIght be ?eard to say, "God has left me, and so I must leave this life by my
o,:"n hand. AllIS empty, burdensome and fearful". Or, pridefully, "God has
WIlled that I be on my own. All is my decision."
There are many pastoral issues surrounding the issue of assisted suicide and
euth~nasia. Am~n.g th~m is the need to promote better pain management,
hospIce care, a spmtuahty of the cross, and communal support for the sick so that
they are not at the margins of life but near its sacred core. We cannot agree with
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Dick Westley's interpretation of life as being completely under the person's
dominion. In light of his argument for suicide and euthanasia for certain persons
in certain conditions, to not be persuasive on this issue of dominion is to
undermine the foundation for his work of "emendating" the tradition. Westley
concludes his work by saying that "If the people of God find my position
unacceptable, I will gladly reconsider."19
These ideas are presented in the hope that Westley will reconsider his thinking
on what human life as "gift" means in light of the enduring moral, and
metaphysical bond between the divine donor and the human recipient.
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